Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe Harbor Post-Momenta by Wessels, Emily M.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2014
Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe
Harbor Post-Momenta
Emily M. Wessels
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wessels, Emily M., "Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe Harbor Post-Momenta" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 311.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/311
Note
Changing Course to Navigate the Patent Safe
Harbor Post-Momenta
Emily M. Wessels*
It is a familiar scene: a patient receives a prescription from
her physician and brings it to her local pharmacy. A pharma-
cist instinctively substitutes the prescribed brand-name drug
with one of the many generic options, each made by a different
pharmaceutical manufacturer. The interchange is so seamless
and familiar that consumers rarely give it a second thought. In
fact, currently about three-quarters of prescriptions are filled
2
with a generic drug.
Thirty years ago the scene would have been strikingly dif-
ferent. In 1983, generic drugs accounted for less than twenty
percent of prescriptions.' But Congress's enactment of the Drug
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tional board and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Dan-
ny Deveny and Robin Lehninger, who played an integral role in publishing
this Note. Heartfelt thanks go to my friends and family, most notably my par-
ents, Richard and Beth Lentz, and my sister, Kristin, for their continuous en-
couragement. Finally, I thank my husband, Joe, for his enduring love and
support. Copyright @ 2014 by Emily M. Wessels.
1. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRIC-
ING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 1 n.2 (2012), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf ("A brand-name drug is a drug
marketed under a proprietary, trademark-protected name."); id. at 1
("[Gleneric drugs . .. are copies of approved brand-name drugs.").
2. See, e.g., id. at 2 (estimating that the generic utilization rate is "about
78 percent for drugs dispensed in retail settings"); Martha M. Rumore, The
Hatch-Waxman Act-25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scales Bal-
anced, PHARMACY TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.pharmacytimes.com/
publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809/Generic
-HatchWaxman-0809 ("[Tioday more than 70% of prescriptions are for gener-
ics . . . .").
3. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 (plac-
ing the generic utilization rate at 19% in 1984); Rumore, supra note 2 ("[Pre-
Hatch-Waxman generic prescriptions numbered 15%.").
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Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19844
marked a shift toward generic proliferation.' The Act-also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman)-
introduced an abbreviated pathway for U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of generic drugs.6 Reflecting
Congress's desire to balance the interests of brand companies,
generic manufacturers, and the public, Hatch-Waxman also
contained a "safe harbor" provision shielding generic manufac-
turers from patent infringement liability for activities "reason-
ably related" to submitting information to the FDA.7 This pro-
vision was designed so that a generic can enter the market as
soon as-but not before-the patent on the brand medication
expires.
Notably, since its enactment the scope of the safe harbor
has progressively widened to apply to medical devices, research
tools, and even information that is ultimately never included in
an FDA submission.! The Federal Circuit's 2011 decision in
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDECo seemed to slow
this momentum toward an unbound interpretation of the safe
harbor. The Classen court appeared to draw a bright line strict-
ly limiting the application of the safe harbor doctrine to activi-
ties occurring before the FDA approves a drug for commercial
4. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
5. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2 ("In-
creased use of generic drugs can partly be attributed to the regulatory frame-
work that was established in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.").
6. Hatch-Waxman Act, §§ 101-106, 98 Stat. at 1585-97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Keysha Bryant,
Biosimilars: The Long and Winding Pathway to Approval, U.S. PHARMACIST:
GENERIC DRUG REV., June 21, 2013, http//www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/
253/c/41438/.
7. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2006)); see also B. Scott Eidson, Note, How Safe Is the Harbor?
Considering the Economic Implications of Patent Infringement in Section
271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1171-75 (2004) (discussing the en-
actment of Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor).
8. See, e.g., Examining the Senate and House Versions of the "Greater Ac-
cess to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act": Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 124-25 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief
Counsel, FDA) (explaining that in enacting Hatch-Waxman, "Congress sought
to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection and marketing exclusivity
for .. . new drugs has expired, consumers would benefit from the rapid availa-
bility of lower priced generic versions of innovator drugs").
9. See infra Part I.D.1.
10. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
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sale." The respite, however, was short lived. In August 2012,
the Federal Circuit changed course in Momenta Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., an infringement
suit between two manufacturers of enoxaparin, the generic ver-
sion of the complex drug Lovenox." The split Momenta panel
held that Amphastar's post-approval use of Momenta's patent-
ed method for analyzing an enoxaparin sample was protected
under the safe harbor because the FDA required the analysis
as a condition of the generic's continued drug approval." Judge
Rader dissented, noting that the decision essentially rendered
the patent worthless by sanctioning unrestricted, indefinite
commercial infringement at the patentee's expense."
Although the Momenta court attempted to reconcile its
holding with Classen, the two decisions' treatments of the tem-
poral scope of the safe harbor are arguably at odds. Satisfactory
resolution of this tension is needed to restore Hatch-Waxman's
intended balance between brand and generic drug manufactur-
ers. Momenta highlights the importance of timely resolution as
the pharmaceutical industry prepares to usher in a new age of
biopharmaceutical-or "biologic"-innovation.'5 Similar to the
complex drug at issue in Momenta, large biologic molecules ne-
cessitate strict quality control analyses to demonstrate the
"sameness" required to qualify as a "follow-on" 6 product (which
11. For commentary contemporaneous with Classen interpreting the deci-
sion as a bright-line limit, see, for example, Aaron F. Barkoff, Federal Circuit
Confines 271 (e)(1) Safe Harbor to Pre-Approval Activities, ORANGE BOOK BLOG
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.orangebookblog.com/2011/08/federal-circuit
-confines-271el-safe-harbor-to-pre-approval-activities.html; Gray Buccigross,
Safe-Harbor Provision of Hatch-Waxman Act Does Not Protect Post-Approval
Research Activities, FDA L. UPDATE (Oct. 24, 2011), http-//www.fdalawblog
.com/2011/10/articles/legislation/safe-harbor-provision-of-hatch-waxman-act
-does-not-protect-post-approval-research-activities/.
12. 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
13. Id. at 1357-59.
14. Id. at 1369-70 (Rader, J., dissenting).
15. See Ian Evans, Follow-on Biologics: A New Play for Big Pharma, 83
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 97, 99 (2010) (discussing the potential of biopharma-
ceuticals to reshape the face of medicine in light of a slowdown in traditional
small-molecule pharmaceutical innovation). For purposes of this Note, the text
refers to the terms biopharmaceutical and biologic interchangeably.
16. Compare Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1350-51 (explaining the complex re-
quirements for determining "sameness" between enoxaparin and Lovenox due
to the drug's molecular diversity), with FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE: QUALITY CON-
SIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PROTEIN
PRODUCT 9-15 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf (de-
2014] 1567
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is comparable to the biologic equivalent of a generic 7 ). If Mo-
menta is allowed to stand for the unfettered proposition that
post-approval quality control processes are unenforceable
against infringers, the result could chill an entire field of intel-
lectual property rights essential for the development of any sort
of meaningful follow-on biologic market.
This Note advocates for a statutory scheme that narrows
safe harbor protection for activities occurring after FDA
approval and provides compensation to all affected patentees.
The proposed changes would restore the balance between eas-
ing the barrier to competitors' market entry and preserving the
intellectual property rights of patent holders responsible for
pharmaceutical innovation. It would also lay groundwork for
the growth of a successful follow-on biologic regime. To this
end, Part I provides a brief overview of the context, enactment,
and judicial evolution of the safe harbor doctrine. Part I also
presents a summary of the Federal Circuit's decisions in
Classen and Momenta. Part II examines the safe harbor's ap-
plication as a liability exception and extrapolates the likely
consequences of the Momenta decision to the field of biophar-
maceuticals. Part III concludes that the safe harbor should
provide adequate recompense to patent holders, whether they
are brand, generic, or follow-on manufacturers. Keeping the in-
terests of both private and public stakeholders in mind, the
proposed solution includes enhanced procedures for notifying
follow-on manufacturers of potential infringement, as well as a
reasonable royalty for all patent owners subjected to the safe
harbor and a period of commercial exclusivity for those facing
excused post-approval infringement.
scribing the many different analytical factors involved in demonstrating simi-
larity between a follow-on biologic and reference product).
17. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34045, FDA
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 1 & n.1 (2010), available at http://
primaryimmune.org/advocacy-center/pdfs/health-care-reform/Biosimilars_
Congressional ResearchServiceReport.pdf (explaining that "[a] follow-on
biologic is similar but not identical to the brand-name . . . product," and that
although sometimes referred to "as biogenerics or generic biologics[, tihe FDA
and many others consider the use of the word generic to be inaccurate because
the term has been used, in the context of chemical drugs, to mean identical");
see also id. at 9-12 (discussing the unique scientific challenges associated with
comparing follow-on biologics with the brand-name drugs).
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE SAFE HARBOR DOCTRINE
The intersection of innovation, patent protection, and FDA
regulation creates challenges unique to the pharmaceutical
field. This Part introduces the nuanced development of the law
in these areas that resulted in the enactment of the safe harbor
doctrine. It continues with an explanation the doctrine's expan-
sion and finishes with a discussion of the Federal Circuit's deci-
sions in Classen and Momenta.
A. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The U.S. pharmaceutical market is a multi-billion dollar
industry with $330 billion in sales in 2012." The market tradi-
tionally has been dominated by small molecule drugs," which
are chemicals with a "well-defined structure [that] can be thor-
oughly characterized." 20 Unfortunately, innovation of truly nov-
el small molecule pharmaceuticals has arguably slowed in re-
cent years.2 1 Instead, companies have concentrated resources
on producing imitation "me-too" products. These drugs tend to
target saturated markets and generally offer few advantages in
terms of therapeutic benefits or favorable side effect profiles.
18. Worldwide Pharmaceutical Sales by Region 2010-2012, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/world-pharmaceutical-sales-by
-region/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
19. See Biotech Products in Big Pharma Clinical Pipelines Have Grown
Dramatically, TUFTS CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete-story/pr-ir-nov-dec_2013 (noting the "historical
concentration on small molecule drugs").
20. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/%20HowDrugs
areDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologic
Applications/ucm113522.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research
and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money?, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 7,
2012, at 22, 23 ("This is the real innovation crisis: pharmaceutical research
and development turns out mostly minor variations on existing drugs .. . .").
22. See AIDAN HOLLIS, ME-TOO DRUGS: IS THERE A PROBLEM? 1 (2004),
available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/iplMe-tooDrugs-
Hollisl.pdf (noting the increased "criticism on the drug industry for the in-
creasing extent to which investment appears to be focused on developing drugs
which have a similar mechanism of action to pre-existing drugs").
23. Id. at 1 (acknowledging the varying definitions of a me-too drug while
defining it as "one that is approved after a pioneering drug and which is [com-
parable or similar] ... and is not clinically superior").
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Recent developments in biopharmaceuticals, however, rep-
resent a possible return to significant innovation. Biologics
are complex molecules produced from living organisms." Bio-
logics are generally on the cutting edge of treatment, offering
new therapeutic options for previously untreatable diseases.
It is projected that by 2015, biolo cs will account for $167 bil-
lion of U.S. pharmaceutical sales.2
The shift from small molecule drugs to biologics under-
scores a key public policy consideration: the need to balance in-
novation of new treatments with affordable access to these life-
saving therapies." The recent skyrocketing of health care costs
highlights the importance of this balancing act." On the one
hand, experts estimate that bringing a new small-molecule
therapy to market may cost as much as $1.3 billion in research
and development (R&D).o On the other, brand-name drugs can
cost consumers hundreds of dollars.2
24. ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY RE-
PORT 1 (2007), available at http//www.biocity.co.uk/file-manager/Group/
reports2007/2007-beyondborders.pdf ("There is no question that biotechnology
is now the engine of innovation for the drug development industry."); Michael
Pohlscheidt & Robert Kiss, Recent Advances and Trends in the Biotechnology
Industry-Development and Manufacturing of Recombinant Proteins and An-
tibodies, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV., Sept./Oct. 2013, http://www
.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/Featured-Articles/148856-Recent
-Advances-and-Trends-in-the-Biotechnology-Industry-Development-and
-Manufacturing-of-Recombinant-Proteins-and-Antibodies/ ("A large number of
[biologics] have been approved, delivering meaningful contributions to pa-
tients' lives, and are anticipated to be the major growth driver for the industry
in the upcoming years.").
25. Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products,
supra note 20.
26. What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, FDA, http-//www.fda
.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/
ucml33077.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).
27. Bhupinder Singh Sekhon & Vikrant Saluja, Biosimilars: An Overview,
BIOSIMILARS, Mar. 14, 2011, at 1, 1.
28. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOG-
Ics INDUSTRY: A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 1 (2008),
available at http://people.bu.edu/kotlikofflNew%20Kotlikofl%20Web%2OPage/
KotlikoffInnovation-inBiologics2l.pdf ("The key issue in providing afforda-
ble access to biologic wonder drugs is doing so without limiting their develop-
ment.").
29. The Skyrocketing Cost of U.S. Health Care: By the Numbers, THE
WEEK, Mar. 30, 2012, http://theweek.com/article/index/226276/the
-skyrocketing-cost-of-us-health-care-by-the-numbers.
30. Compare Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Esti-
mates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (calcu-
lating the cost of drug development as $802 million), and Joseph A. DiMasi &
Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Differ-
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The R&D costs are just as high, if not higher, for biolog-
ics. 32 Biologics also take longer to develop and have a lower suc-
cess rate than small-molecule drugs." These consequences
stem from the complexity of biologic molecules." Because bio-
logics are derivatives of living organisms, even small manufac-
turing differences can cause significant variations in the end
product." The increased development costs are then passed on
to consumers.3 6 To illustrate, the yearly cost of biologic therapy
averages $16,425, compared to $730 for traditional pharmaceu-
ticals.
Fortunately, market competition can help control consum-
ers' costs.3" The proliferation of generics demonstrates the bene-
ent?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 476 (2007) (using a time-
adjusted drug development cost of $1.318 billion), with Donald W. Light & Re-
becca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Re-
search, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 34, 46 (2011) (critiquing DiMasi et al. and placing
the cost of drug development at a median of $43.4 million). But see Tufts
CSDD's Official Response to the Recent Light & Warburton Commentary,
TUFTs CENTER FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Mar. 2011), http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/
complete-story/internal-news (responding to Light & Warburton's critique in
support of DiMasi et al.).
31. See, e.g., Ganesan Marimuthu et al., Maintaining Patents Protecting
Biologics or Small-Molecule Drugs, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 50, 50 (2012);
Linda A. Johnson, Drug Prices to Plummet in Wave of Expiring Patents,
NBCNEWS.COM (July 25, 2011, 1:44:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
43882446/ns/health-healthcare/t/drug-prices-plummet-wave-expiring-patents/
#.Us3j87QOwqc.
32. See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 30, at 475-76 (recognizing that
overall figures for biologic development may be higher than traditional phar-
maceuticals depending on the accuracy of time-adjusted calculations).
33. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R 41483, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: THE LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS-
SUES 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mise/R41483.pdf
[hereinafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES].
34. See ANDREW F. BOURGOIN, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC MARKET IN THE U.S.: IMPLICATIONS, STRATEGIES, AND
IMPACT 1 (2011), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/science/
pdf/ls/newport-biologics.pdf ("[Mlany [biologics] demand substantial invest-
ment to manufacture due to the product complexity.").
35. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33,
at 15.
36. BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 ("The high development cost of biologic
products is often reflected in their price.").
37. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO WITH KARAN SINGH & MEGHA MUKIM, THE PO-
TENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE
ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 4 (2008), available at http://www.sonecon.com/
docs/studies/0208_GenericBiologiesStudy.pdf.
38. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 ("The
competition that brand-name drugs face from generic equivalents is associated
with lower overall drug prices . . . .").
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ficial effects of competition. Since generic small molecule drugs
have become widely available, these products have been substi-
tuted for brand-name drugs at an average cost savings of sev-
enty-five percent. It is further estimated that a successful
biosimilars market could produce savings of up to forty per-
cent, 40 demonstrating the importance of fostering competition
as the biopharmaceutical field continues to grow.
B. U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
Faced with such high R&D costs, the patent system offers
pharmaceutical companies an opportunity to recover some of
those costs. A patent allows its holder to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention for a defined
period of time. 41 The U.S. system of exclusivity is grounded in
an economic/utilitarian philosophy, providing the economic re-
ward of a limited monopoly as an incentive for conferring the
"ultimate benefit to the public" through technological advance-
ment and increased institutional knowledge. The economic
reward of exclusivity not only offers the patentee a chance to
recoup its investment by singularly exploiting the technology,
but the patentee may ultimately realize profits above and be-
yond the cost of innovation. 3 Alternatively, the patent owner
may license the invention for use by others, which generally in-
volves a reasonable royalty or other form of compensation to
the patentee. It is this potential for significant return on in-
vestment that is a key driver of pharmaceutical innovation.
39. Id.
40. BOURGOIN, supra note 34 ("At the individual product level, reports are
estimating that biosimilars may cost between 60 and 80 percent of the refer-
ence biologic therapy upon market entry.").
41. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); see also id. §§ 101-03 (specifying that an
inventive process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that meets
three basic requirements-namely utility, novelty, and nonobviousness-may
be eligible for patent protection).
42. See Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experi-
mental Use: Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 351, 358-59 (2005); see also Maureen O'Rourke, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
1177, 1182 (2000) ("In the absence of some mechanism to allow the originator
to at least recoup his or her investment, information will be under-produced.").
43. See Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects
on the Conflict Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711, 715-16 (2003).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (describing the right to a reasonable royalty).
45. See Gillat, supra note 43.
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Unrestrained exclusivity, however, undercuts the utilitari-
an underpinnings of the patent system.16 It leads to overprotec-
tion and limits access to information, decreasing the net benefit
to society.47 U.S. patent law, therefore, does not grant unfet-
tered exclusivity. Rather, certain liability exceptions exist for
situations where society has determined that the benefits of ac-
cess to the invention outweigh the costs to the patent holder.
These liability exceptions limit the patent owner's exclusive
right to use or license the patented invention. In the interest
of maintaining the balance between the economic and utilitari-
an underpinnings of the U.S. patent system, such exceptions
are granted sparingly.o
C. FDA REGULATION
Simply having a patent, however, does not give a pharma-
ceutical company an affirmative right to sell its product." A
manufacturer must have an FDA-approved application before it
can bring a drug to market." The scope of information required
in the initial application makes the approval process expensive
and time consuming, adding to the costs of R&D.13 The FDA
can also condition continued approval on the collection of post-
approval safety and efficacy data. 4
The approval process itself has evolved over time. In most
circumstances, a company wanting to market a new, or "pio-
neer," drug must file a New Drug Application (NDA) demon-
46. See O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 1183.
47. Id. at 1183 n.16.
48. Gillat, supra note 43, at 713-14.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 714 (describing the exceptions to patent exclusivity as "narrow
and specific").
51. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R
41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 1 (2012), avail-
able at httpJ/www.law.umaryland.edulmarshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
R41114 03132013.pdf.
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (mandating FDA approval of "new drugs"
and describing the application requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (requir-
ing the licensure of biologics).
53. ALAN MINSK ET AL., FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., THE 505(b)(2) NEW
DRUG APPLICATION PROCESS: THE ESSENTIAL PRIMER ii (2010), available at
http://www.fdli.org/resources/resources-order-box-detail-view/the-505%28b%
29%282%29-new-drug-application-process-the-essential-primer (describing the
studies required by the FDA as the "most time-consuming and expensive part
of the drug development process").
54. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.165 (2013).
2014]1 1573
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strating the drug is safe and effective." Historically, another
company wanting to sell its generic version of that drug also
had to file its own NDA.16 Unfortunately, this system produced
some unintended consequences. The NDA process could tie up
years of patent exclusivity for the pioneer drug before the drug
could enter the market. At the same time, later companies
had to invest millions of dollars to produce the same safety and
efficacy data provided by the pioneer company.58 Furthermore,
the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co. prevented generic manufacturers from
conducting tests with the pioneer drug until the patent ex-
pired. 9 This essentially granted the pioneer manufacturer a de
facto extension of its monopoly during the time it took the ge-
neric company to perform the required studies."o Delayed ge-
neric entry decreased market competition, keeping drug prices
high.6'
Congress responded to these unintended consequences by
enacting Hatch-Waxman. Addressing the first issue, Hatch-
Waxman included limited patent term extensions to offset the
delays associated with FDA approval.6 2 Regarding the second
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
56. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLI-
CATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 ("THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT") 20 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland
.edulmarshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/rl3075601102005.pdf [hereinafter
SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION].
57. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (noting that it could take up to ten years for a drug to be approved
after the NDA was submitted to the FDA), superseded by statute, Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, as recognized in
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Eliza-
beth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003) ("[T]he 1962
Amendments [to the FDA drug approval process] resulted in a significant ero-
sion of the term of exclusivity provided to pharmaceutical manufacturers un-
der the patent laws.").
58. See Roche, 733 F.2d at 860 (describing federally mandated premarket-
ing tests); SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 20 (noting
characterization of the requirement that generic manufacturers independently
prove safety and effectiveness as "needlessly costly, duplicative and time-
consuming"); cf supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the high
costs of drug development).
59. Roche, 733 F.2d at 861.
60. See Freeburg, supra note 42, at 366.
61. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590.
62. Id. at 590-91.
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concern, Hatch-Waxman introduced an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) pathway to eliminate the duplicity associ-
ated with requiring an NDA for subsequent versions of ap-
proved drugs.6 3 Rather than requiring independent safety and
efficacy data, an ANDA allows a generic manufacturer to des-
ignate an already-approved product as a "reference" product
and rely on the data included in the reference product's NDA to
meet the FDA's approval criteria. The generic manufacturer
need only demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent to the
reference product." Finally, Hatch-Waxman created a process
for resolving patent disputes before the generic is approved for
market entry." The Act made it "an act of infringement to
submit [an ANDA] ... for a drug claimed in a patent or the use
of which is claimed in a patent"67 and detailed a procedure for
challenging those patents.
The ANDA process itself, however, did not remedy the de
facto patent extension ratified by the court in Roche. A generic
manufacturer still could not commence the required bioequiva-
lence studies until the patents on the reference product ex-
pired. 9 Congress thus included a safe harbor provision in
Hatch-Waxman to address this problem, essentially overturn-
ing Roche.70 This provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States ... a patented invention ... solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs ... .1
The theory behind the safe harbor was that a generic man-
ufacturer could complete the necessary bioequivalence studies
63. Id. at 593-94.
64. Id. at 594-95.
65. Id.; see also Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www
.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYoulConsumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm00100
.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013) (describing bioequivalence as "identical ...
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance
characteristics and intended use").
66. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.
67. Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603
(1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006)).
68. See id. §§ 201-202, 98 Stat. at 1598-1603; Weiswasser & Danzis, su-
pra note 57, at 595-603.
69. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 605.
70. Id.; see Hatch-Waxman Act, § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
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and receive approval of its ANDA during the life of the patent.7
But the generic manufacturer could not sell its product so long
as the product or its use was covered by a patent, preserving
the patent owner's right to commercial exclusivity during the
patent term by preventing the generic from entering the mar-
ket until the patent expired.
Notably, Hatch-Waxman's patent dispute resolution proce-
dures and ANDA provisions were implemented as amendments
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the statute that regulates
small-molecule drugs.7 4 Most biologics, on the other hand, are
regulated under the Public Health Services Act." As a conse-
quence, neither the patent term extension nor the ANDA pro-
cess introduced by Hatch-Waxman generally applies to biolog-
ics. Some portions of Hatch-Waxman, however, amended
statutes outside the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The safe
harbor was one of these broader provisions and was incorpo-
rated as a general amendment to the Patent Act. As a result,
the safe harbor is considered applicable to biologics."
72. SCHACHT & THOMAS, EXAMINATION, supra note 56, at 25.
73. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) [hereinafter Committee Re-
port] ("[Section 271(e)(1)] does not permit the commercial sale of a patented
drug . . . ."); id. at pt. 2, at 30 ("In this case the generic manufacturer is not
permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the patent . . . ."); see
also Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286,
and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 926 (1984) [hereinafter
Hearing] (memorandum of Alfred B. Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association) (agreeing on behalf of the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association that the safe harbor "does not authorize
any activity which would deprive the patent owner of the sale of a single tablet
during the life of a valid patent").
74. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33901, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION
ISSUES 13 (2009), available at https://opencrs.com/document/RL33901/ [here-
inafter SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES].
75. Id. at 3; Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological
Products, supra note 20.
76. SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 74, at 13 ("To
the extent that a particular biologic is approved under the auspices of the PHS
Act, however, these provisions would be inapplicable."). But see id. at 6 ("Be-
cause the definition of 'drugs' under the FDC Act is broad, however, the FDA
states that '[bliological products subject to the PHS Act also meet the defini-
tion of drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' (alteration in
original) (quoting Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological
Products, supra note 20)).
77. See id. at 13.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Because biologics were excluded from the ANDA provisions
of Hatch-Waxman, until recently no procedure existed for ex-
pedited approval of follow-on biologics." Previously, a company
wanting to market its version of an approved biologic had to fol-
low the same approval pathway as the pioneer and file its own
Biologic License Application (BLA).8' Needless to say, the sys-
tem suffered from the same wasted resources problem that
plagued the small-molecule approval process prior to Hatch-
Waxman." Expedited approval of follow-on biologics, however,
presented its own unique challenges. First, developing a follow-
on biologic is generally much more costly than developing a ge-
neric small-molecule drug." Second, the complexity of biologic
molecules can make it extremely difficult to demonstrate the
"sameness" required to establish bioequivalence.8 '
Nevertheless, Congress turned its attention to establishing
an abbreviated approval mechanism for biosimilars in the Bio-
logics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA)."
The BPCIA allows a company to designate an approved biologic
as a reference product and file an Abbreviated Biologic License
Application for approval of its follow-on product." The Act di-
vides these follow-on products into two categories: biosimilars
and interchangeable biologics." To be biosimilar, the biologic
must be "highly similar" to the reference product with no clini-
80. See Jeanne Yang, Note, A Pathway to Follow-On Biologics, 3
HASTINGS Scl. & TECH. L.J. 217, 218 (2011).
81. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006); Biologics License Applications
(BLA) Process (CBER), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/ (last
updated Feb. 13, 2010).
82. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 80, at 219; Andrew Jack, Pharmaceuticals:
Biosimilar Drugs Show the Copycats Keeping Up with Creators, FINANIAL
TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2013, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
FTFT000020131017e9ah0000h; Denise Myshko, What's Ahead for Biosimilars,
PHARMAVOICE (Feb. 2012), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/
Corporate/Press%20Room/IMS%20in%20the%20News/Documents/
PharmaVOICEO212-IMS-Biosimilars.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Sekhon & Saluja, supra note 27, at 2-3; Yang, supra note 80,
at 230.
85. Though introduced separately in 2009, the BPCIA was ultimately in-
corporated into the Affordable Care Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804-21 (2010).
86. See id. § 7002(a)-(b), 124 Stat. at 804-15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262
(2006)).
87. Id-
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cally meaningful differences in safety, purity, or potency." An
interchangeable biologic is a biosimilar "expected to produce
the same clinical result as the reference product" such that
switching between the two products presents no more risk to
the patient than repeat administration with the reference
product." An interchangeable can be freely substituted for the
reference product." The first approved interchangeable biologic
for each reference product is granted a period of market exclu-
sivity, the length of which varies depending on its commercial
and litigation status.9 '
The statute also provides a mechanism for identifying and
resolving patent disputes.92 The BPCIA system differs from the
Hatch-Waxman process, accounting for the fact that small dif-
ferences in manufacturing can significantly impact the end
product and recognizing that novel, complex processes may be
necessary to establish the high degree of similarity required for
classification as a biosimilar.9' Unlike Hatch-Waxman's focus
on patented compounds and their methods of use, the BPCIA
framework also facilitates challenges to patents on the "method
of making" a drug.94 The ability to challenge these types of pa-
tents reflects the increased importance of manufacturing and
quality control patents in the biologic industry."
88. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
89. Id. § 262(k)(4).
90. Id. § 262(i)(3).
91. Id. § 262(k)(6).
92. Id. § 262(l).
93. See Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (A Lack of) Science: Limitations in
Determining Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to
Their Approval and Commercialization, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 1 5, 30,
42-46.
94. Id. 30 ("Another important difference between the ANDA and [fol-
low-on biologic] approval pathways is that under [Hatch-Waxman], method-of-
production (or process) patents cannot be asserted. In contrast, the BPCIA al-
lows infringement actions against an entity 'making' the allegedly infringing
product, so method-of-production patents can be asserted against [follow-on
biologic] sponsors."). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) ("The [NDA] appli-
cant shall [include] ... any patent which claims the drug ... or which claims a
method of using such drug. . . ."), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)-(3) (2006) (requir-
ing the follow-on applicant to provide the reference product sponsor with a
copy of its application and "such other information that describes the process
or processes used to manufacture the biological product" and allowing the
product sponsor to list all patents potentially infringed based on that infor-
mation).
95. See Woodage, supra note 93 (discussing the challenges facing follow-on
manufacturers caused by the scientific and regulatory differences between bio-
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D. EXPANSION OF THE SAFE HARBOR 96
While its statutory language has remained relatively un-
changed since 1984, the reach of the safe harbor has not re-
mained static. Rather, important questions about the proper
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have led to judicial decisions signif-
icantly enlarging its protections in the intervening decades
since its enactment.7 More recently, two Federal Circuit deci-
sions have focused renewed attention on the question of the
safe harbor's scope.
1. Previous Judicial Developments
Reflecting a generally liberal approach to the safe harbor,
courts have endorsed a broad interpretation of § 271(e)(1)'s
text." In one of the first landmark safe harbor decisions, the
Supreme Court extended the safe harbor beyond its statutory
"drug" language and declared that § 271(e)(1) applies to medi-
cal devices as well.9 Courts have also interpreted the word
"solely" such that safe harbor protection can exist even if sub-
mission requirements under federal law are not the only, or
even the primary, motivating factor behind the infringing ac-
tion.100 The Supreme Court has further construed the term
"solely" to support its conclusion that the safe harbor does not
categorically deny protection to activities that ultimately do not
result in a submission to the FDA.' 0
logics and small molecule drugs); see also infra notes 200-03 and accompany-
ing text.
96. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, this section presents a
representative selection of cases interpreting the safe harbor in the years since
its enactment.
97. See Eidson, supra note 7, at 1180.
98. See, e.g., Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d
1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
1269, 1279-80 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
99. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (reasoning
that safe harbor protection applies to medical devices because even though
they were not specifically included in the statutory text, they are subject to
lengthy FDA regulatory approval processes similar to the drug approval pro-
cess that motivated the enactment of Hatch-Waxman).
100. See, e.g., Telectronics, 982 F.2d 1520 ("Federal Circuit precedents indi-
cate that . .. ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude application
of the section 271(e)(1) exemption."); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107-08 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron
Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
101. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005)
("[T]he use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under§ 271(e)(1) as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experi-
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2. Recent Federal Circuit Interpretations
More recently, the Federal Circuit issued two critical deci-
sions interpreting the scope of the safe harbor. First was
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC in August
2011.102 The Classen plaintiff sued several biotech companies
for infringing its various patents on methods for evaluating and
improving immunization schedules.103 The allegedly infringing
activities involved evaluating vaccination schedules of already-
approved vaccines.'04 The defendants argued that these activi-
ties were protected under the safe harbor doctrine because they
were "reasonably related" to regulations that required vaccine
manufacturers to review and report adverse reactions to the
FDA. 05
A split panel-with Judge Moore dissenting-rejected the
defendants' argument, holding that the safe harbor "does not
apply to information that may be routinely reported to the
FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained."o' The
court continued to conclude that the defendants' activities were
not immune because they were "not related to producing infor-
mation for a [new drug application], and [were] not a 'phase of
research' possibly leading to marketing approval."' Legal
commentary interpreted this decision as endorsing a strict pre-
approval limitation on the safe harbor's scope. 10s
Then, in August 2012, the Federal Circuit issued a seem-
ingly conflicting decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals.'09 Momenta involved a suit be-
tween two generic manufacturers over a patented method for
ments will produce 'the types of information that are relevant to a [new drug
application].').
102. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
103. Id. at 1060; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, 454 (D. Md.
2005).
104. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
105. Id.; Classen, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
106. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
107. Id. at 1072.
108. See, e.g., Barkoff, supra note 11; Buccigross, supra note 11; see also
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe [Classen] parties and the amici cer-
tainly thought Classen turned on a pre-/post-approval distinction."), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
109. 686 F.3d 1348.
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analyzing samples of the complex drug enoxaparin."o Because
of the molecular diversity of enoxaparin, the FDA had pre-
scribed five criteria generic companies would need to satisfy to
establish bioequivalence for purposes of an ANDA, including
analysis of the molecular identity of the drug."' The FDA fur-
ther specified that continued analysis of each batch of drug was
required to maintain marketing approval. 112 The patent-in-suit,
directed to satisfying these requirements, was assigned to Mo-
menta," which claimed that Amphastar infringed the patent
"by 'manufacturing generic enoxaparin for commercial sale' us-
ing the claimed methods""' to test "each commercial batch of
enoxaparin [to] be sold after FDA approval.""'
Focusing on the statutory language, Judge Moore's majori-
ty opinion rejected Momenta's argument that Classen had deci-
sively limited safe harbor protection to pre-approval activi-
ties."' The court determined that Amphastar's post-approval
uses of the patented method fell squarely under the safe harbor
because "the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspec-
tion satisfie[d] the requirement that the uses be reasonably re-
lated to the development and submission of information to the
FDA.""7 The court distinguished Classen on the grounds that
the specific studies performed in that case were not mandated
by the FDA."' The court further declined to condition its exten-
110. Id. at 1349.
111. Id. at 1350.
112. Id. at 1352 ("FDA requires a generic manufacture to include in its
manufacturing process the analysis of each batch of its enoxaparin drug sub-
stance to confirm that ... [it] includes a 1, 6-anhydro ring structure." (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Letter from FDA to Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(July 23, 2010))).
113. Id. at 1351.
114. Id. at 1352.
115. Id. at 1353.
116. Id. at 1353, 1358-60.
117. Id. at 1357.
118. Id. at 1358 ("This case, however, fits well within Classen because the
information submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the
ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug.. .. The submissions to
the FDA in this case are anything but 'routine'-they implicate Amphastar's
very ability to continue its FDA approval for its ANDA and to continue manu-
facturing and marketing enoxaparin under its ANDA. We also note that, un-
like in Classen where the patented studies performed were not mandated by
the FDA, the information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufac-
turer but is generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated
under penalty of law to follow. Under such circumstances, the information can
be said to have been gathered solely for submission to the FDA and not, as in
Classen, primarily for non-FDA purposes.").
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sion of the safe harbor to post-approval activities on the ab-
sence of non-infringing alternatives, allowing competitors "the
freedom to use an otherwise patented means to develop the
necessary information" even when non-infringing methods ex-
ist."9
Judge Rader issued a strongly worded dissent, critiquing
the majority's purported failure to adequately consider the
purpose of the statute in light of the "not plainly comprehensi-
ble" text.2 o Citing extensively to the legislative history of
Hatch-Waxman, Judge Rader maintained that Congress clearly
intended the safe harbor to be limited to pre-approval activities
in order to balance competition and innovation.' 2' He empha-
sized that the majority's contrary interpretation endorsed "con-
tinuous, commercial infringing sales during any portion of the
life of the patent."'2 2 Judge Rader also took issue with the ma-
jority's construction of the word "submission" to mean the re-
quired retention of records that may or may not be inspected by
the FDA" and its acceptance that the statutory requirement
that infringement be "solely for uses reasonably related" to the
development of required data could be satisfied by uses "pri-
marily for production of a commercial product.""' In conclusion,
Judge Rader foreshadowed that the majority's extension of the
safe harbor would "essentially render manufacturing method
patents worthless."12
II. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE SAFE
HARBOR
Momenta is a landmark decision as the first extension of
safe harbor protection to activities that occur after FDA ap-
proval. 2 6 Its practical consequences for the patentee-as high-
119. Id. at 1359 ("This makes good sense because it .... avoids the situa-
tion here, where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from
the market based on an FDA mandated testing requirement.").
120. Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtron-
ic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1366.
123. Id. at 1367 ("This new interpretation would allow almost all activity
by pharmaceutical companies to constitute 'submission' and therefore justify a
free license to trespass.").
124. Id. at 1374.
125. Id. at 1369.
126. See, e.g., Isabelle Blundell, Safe Harbor Protects Post-Approval Activi-
ties, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at 11, 11,
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lighted by Judge Rader-also demonstrate that the safe harbor
presents an outdated model for an evolving pharmaceutical in-
dustry that places increased emphasis on manufacturing meth-
ods.'27 This Part explores why biologics and other complex
drugs do not fit neatly into the current framework of the safe
harbor. It reaches the conclusion that neither limiting the safe
harbor to pre-approval experimentation nor expanding protec-
tion to all post-approval activities would adequately promote
Hatch-Waxman's intended balance between innovation and ac-
cess in today's pharmaceutical landscape.
A. THE SAFE HARBOR AS A LIABILITY EXCEPTION
Section 271(e)(1)'s safe harbor operates as one of the few
liability exceptions granted under U.S. patent law. 2 ' It excuses
certain, otherwise infringing practices encompassed by the
statutory language and terminates the patent owner's right to
exclude with respect to those practices.'2 9 In order to best eval-
uate the practical implications of applying the current safe
harbor exemption to the field of biologics, one must first exam-
ine the underlying policy considerations of imposing a liability
exception.
1. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Patentees' Rights
Liability exceptions arise out of a desire to excuse certain
infringing activities.13 0 Several existing exceptions in U.S. pa-
tent law, including the safe harbor, reflect a "public benefit"
theory-a desire to "allow socially beneficial uses that generate
available at http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/safe-harbor-protects-post
-approval-activities/4518/.
127. See Terry G. Mahn & Dr. Erin L. Baker, Is the Safe Harbor Too Safe
for Certain Biologic Patents?, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Aug.
16, 2013), http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/is-the-safe-harbor-too
-safe-for-certain-biologic-patents/5396/ ("The implications of Momemta [sic]
are particularly significant for biologic manufacturers who are required to
maintain and provide to FDA, batch-by-batch data on drugs being offered for
commercial sale."); supra notes 93-95, 122, 125 and accompanying text.
128. See O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 1197-98; see also supra notes 46-50
and accompanying text (discussing liability exceptions in U.S. patent law).
129. See, e.g., Patcharin Pisut, Freedom to Research: Room for Trial and
Error in Drug Development After Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 339, 339.
130. See O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 1181; supra text accompanying note
48.
15832014]1
1584 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1565
large positive externalities.""' Under this theory, exceptions
are justified when the net public benefit outweighs the intru-
sion on the private rights granted to the patent holder. 1
The existence and scope of an exception based in public
benefit theory therefore represents a balancing of stakeholder
interests between the patentee and the public. Specifically, the
greater the benefit and the smaller the intrusion, the more jus-
tified the exception-and vice versa. 33 Due to the substantial
intrusion on the patentee's rights, infringement that furthers
direct commercial competition weighs significantly against
granting an exception for such activities. 134
2. Balancing Stakeholder Interests: Impact on Innovation
In addition to the individual costs to the patentee, social
costs imposed by a disincentive to innovate can decrease the
net public benefit. '" Patent exclusivity not only offers an oppor-
tunity to recover costs associated with invention, but it also in-
cludes the lure of a substantial return on investment if an in-
vention is successful.136 These potential revenues are often a
strong driver behind innovation. ' If these exclusivity incen-
131. Id. at 1197-98 (listing examples of "situations in which the public
benefit from the infringement may be so great that it outweighs the patentee's
interest in its exclusive rights").
132. Id.
133. See O'Rourke, supra 42, at 1189 (using copyright law to explain the
doctrine of positive externalities for later discussion within the context of pa-
tent law). The importance of minimizing intrusion on the patentee's rights is
echoed in the international arena. See id. at 1201 ("'[Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement miembers may provide lim-
ited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the pa-
tent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.").
134. See id. at 1204-05 (noting a lack of authority "support[ing] excusing
commercial infringement that occurs in the marketing of a directly infringing
product").
135. See, e.g., WILLIAM JACK, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH ECONOMICS FOR DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 180 (1999); O'Rourke, supra note 42, at 1182-83 (de-
scribing the underproduction of information associated with the public goods
problem).
136. See Gillat, supra note 43, at 715-16 ("It has been proposed that inno-
vation is stimulated not merely by the potential of recouping the costs of R&D
and capturing profits. Rather, it is stimulated also by the skew of the reward
distribution; in other words, by the odds-however small-of hitting the 'jack-
pot' and to be one of the small minority of inventions that collect spectacular
profits.").
137. See id.
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tives are removed-not only limiting the opportunity to recoup
costs but increasing the risk of loss-the motive to invent can
often disappear with them.'3 ' Thus while the public may benefit
from a liability exception through increased access to a particu-
lar invention, any corresponding slowdown in innovation and
advancement caused by the exception detracts from its overall
net benefit.'
Several factors influence the scope and likelihood of a po-
tential slowing in innovation caused by limiting a patent hold-
er's right to exclusivity.40 These factors include the market sig-
nificance of competing activities, the predictability of losing
patent exclusivity, and the availability of alternative means for
recouping costs and reaping profits.'4 ' Notably, these factors
present unique considerations in the context of pharmaceutical
innovation, which is particularly sensitive to the financial in-
centives of the patent system. 142
a. Market Significance
A first-and arguably most substantial-factor presaging
an undesirable effect on innovation is market significance."3 In
this context, market significance depends on the degree of com-
petition between the patent holder and the entity practicing the
unauthorized use.144 It also correlates with the expected market
harm to the patentee. 4 5 Direct competition between an unau-
thorized user and an established product or service of the pa-
tentee has high market significance. 146 Market significance is
lower, however, if the unauthorized use involves an untested
product or the parties operate in different markets. '4' The lower
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation:
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 873 (2003) (using a compulsory licensing format to
explore factors affecting pharmaceutical companies' incentive to innovate);
Gillat, supra note 43, at 716 ("[Ilnnovation is highly responsive to economic
stimuli. Incentives to innovate depend on[, among other things,] . .. the rate
and ease at which competitive imitation of the innovation occurs.").
141. See infra Part II.A.2(a)-(c).
142. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 98-99 (2000).
143. Chien, supra note 140, at 873, 879-80.
144. Id. at 873.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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the market significance, the less likely the unauthorized use
will negatively impact the patent holder's potential profits. 14
The smaller the potential impact on the patentee's return on
investment, the less likely financial considerations will deter
innovation.'4 1 On the other hand, the higher the market signifi-
cance and risk of financial injury is, the greater the patentee's
disincentive to innovate.' 0
In a pharmaceutical context, generic small molecule drugs
and interchangeable biosimilars represent products with the
greatest market significance. These products are direct compet-
itors because they can be substituted for the respective refer-
ence product without prescriber intervention."' In fact, some
states require that pharmacists substitute a generic for the
brand drug unless the prescriber specifically requests the
latter.'52 Distinct drugs in the same therapeutic class also gen-
erally have high market significance as they "compete for es-
sentially the same population of patients" and may be "virtual-
ly indistinguishable" with respect to safety and effectiveness. 153
This category likely includes biosimilars that do not meet the
criteria for interchangeability.' 4 Still, these products have a
lesser effect on profits than direct substitutes.5"' Drugs from
different classes used to treat the same condition may also have
some market significance, but the level of competition between
such products is often minimized by important differences in
148. Id.
149. Gillat, supra note 43, at 716-17.
150. See id.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3) (2006) (defining an interchangeable biologic
as a biosimilar that can be substituted "without the intervention of the
healthcare provider"); William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution
Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1384
(2010) (explaining generic substitution laws); see also supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
152. Shrank et al., supra note 151.
153. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars-Drug Promotion in a
Competitive Market, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1350 (1994) (explaining the
"highly competitive marketplace" among drugs in discrete therapeutic classes).
154. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits-
Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009) ("If
biosimilar products are not similarly interchangeable with the original biologic
product, they could not be substituted for the original and would have to be
marketed to physicians as therapeutic alternatives.... The market for [these]
biosimilar products is likely to resemble that for new members of a chemical
class that already has established therapeutic value.").
155. Id.
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effectiveness or side effects.'56 This same logic suggests that ab-
sent extenuating circumstances, the market significance of in-
dividual drugs used to treat different diseases is minimal.
Notably, because of its relationship with competition, mar-
ket significance also corresponds with the degree of consumer
cost savings realized by the introduction of another product. 157
Direct substitutes, with their highest market significance, also
produce the greatest price decreases. "8 The addition of distinct
competitors in the same (or another) therapeutic class, howev-
er, does not necessarily result in significantly lower prices be-
cause usurping sales from the established drug requires pre-
scriber intervention."' In fact, companies can sometimes charge
more for a new drug, even in an already-crowded class.' 6 ' And
"entirely new classes of compounds to treat a disease or condi-
tion are often priced at a premium relative to older classes."
16
'
b. Predictability
A second factor affecting the incentive to innovate is the
foreseeability of lost or diminished exclusivity.162 A key variable
of this factor is whether the exception is applied to existing
technology or future developments. 6  When an unpredictable
156. See, e.g., Atholl Johnston et al., Effectiveness, Safety and Cost of Drug
Substitution in Hypertension, 70 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 320, 322-
23 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2949902/
pdf/bcp0070-0320.pdf (explaining that although switching between two differ-
ent classes of blood pressure medications is common, differences in safety, ef-
fectiveness, and drug interactions impact the desirability of the interchange).
157. See, e.g., Engelberg et al., supra note 154, at 1918 (contrasting the
market for drugs in the same therapeutic class "from that for small-molecule
generics, in which interchangeability creates intense price competition that
swiftly reduces the market share of the expensive branded product").
158. Id.
159. Kessler et al., supra note 153 ("Traditional economics might sug-
gest ... that a late entry would have to be priced below its competitors to win
a market share. Sometimes this is the case. However, companies also rely on
the widely held notion-not always true-that what is newer is better and is
therefore worth more.").
160. Id. ("Aggressive advertising campaigns and lack of information among
prescribing physicians about comparative costs can facilitate the higher pric-
ing of 'me too' drugs.").
161. JOSEPH A. DIMASI, PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION: PHARMACEUTI-
CALS: 1995-1999 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drug
-papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm.
162. Chien, supra note 140, at 873.
163. See id. ("Unpredictable licenses that cover only existing technologies
are more limited in scope than those that are predictable and cover future in-
ventions.").
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reduction in exclusivity is granted on existing technology, it
may be too late to make any significant strategy alterations,
minimizing the impact on innovation.164 If a company is able to
predict that a certain project will be subject to lessened patent
protection, however, it can prospectively alter its course of ac-
tion related to the technology.'65 Adjustments may include re-
ducing investment in the project or abandoning it altogether. '
Thus, even academics who downplay diminished exclusivity's
potential to stifle innovation recognize that such an effect is
more likely under a system that applies exceptions liberally. 67
As previously discussed, since its enactment the safe har-
bor's protections have been applied with growing frequency to
an increasing number of settings.' This trend toward a broad
interpretation increases the chance that a particular pharma-
ceutical development will be subject to lost exclusivity under
the safe harbor. Although each new widening of the safe harbor
may come too late to affect existing R&D, pharmaceutical com-
panies have the ability to tailor future developments to avoid
circumstances where the courts have interpreted § 271(e)(1) to
apply broadly.
c. Availability ofAlternative Means for Recouping Costs
Taken together, the first two factors demonstrate that a
liability exemption combining high market significance and
great predictability can result in a significant disincentive to
innovate."' Nonetheless, even an adverse impact on innovation
caused by high market significance and predictability may be
mitigated by alternative means for recouping return on in-
vestment.'7 o Trade secrecy is the most comparable alternative
to patenting for protecting the value of an invention that would
164. Id.
165. Id. at 873-74.
166. Id. at 874.
167. See, e.g., Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Ef-
ficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1292; see also Gillat, supra
note 43, at 717 ("A compulsory license that is relatively easy to obtain and that
involves low royalties set by someone other than the patentee has a potential
negative effect on the incentives for innovation.").
168. See supra Part I.D.
169. Chien, supra note 140, at 879-80.
170. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents:
An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295,
304 (1994) (exploring the various options available to companies faced with
lost patent exclusivity).
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otherwise have limited or no patent protection."' Such an ap-
proach, however, can decrease overall social welfare by reduc-
ing the amount of information publicly available.172 An entity
may alternatively increase revenues by raising prices."' But in
a truly competitive market, this is generally not a viable option
as sales will simply shift to the cheaper alternative.'7 ' A third
option is to decrease expenditures. 175 Unfortunately, limited ex-
penditures can raise serious questions about resource alloca-
tion affecting R&D.'76
On the whole, the pharmaceutical industry is foreclosed
from many of the alternative means for recouping investment
costs. The extreme disclosure requirements associated with
FDA approval make trade secret protection unfeasible.'77 As far
as raising revenues, a competitive market with generic en-
trants forecloses the option of increased prices."' A company
operating in a truly competitive market also likely would be as
ill-advised in cutting advertising expenditures as in raising
prices-either option is apt to result in a loss of market
share."' The bulk of a pharmaceutical manufacturer's remain-
ing expenditures consist of R&D.180 As a result, a manufacturer
needing to compensate for the lost value of patent exclusivity
without raising prices would be most inclined to reduce risk.'s'
This could mean limiting research to more reliable, less-
171. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723.
172. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d
1348, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining the information
disclosure problems associated with keeping inventions secret), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
173. Fisch, supra note 170, at 305.
174. Id. at 306-07 ("Price theory teaches that in a competitive market-
place, a seller will not profit from a unilateral price increase because purchas-
ers will select a less expensive substitute.").
175. Id. at 308.
176. See id. at 308-13.
177. Gillat, supra note 43, at 723 ("The most obvious alternative protec-
tion-trade secrecy-is not an option for the pharmaceutical industry because
detailed disclosure is required for purposes of approval of the drug, and then
for marketing. This is amplified by patent law rules and the industry's ten-
dency to patent its compounds and processes at an early stage of re-
search....").
178. Fisch, supra note 170, at 307 ("[P]harmaceutical companies cannot
expect to create a healthy balance sheet by increasing prices on pharmaceuti-
cals in a competitive marketplace.").
179. Id. at 306-11.
180. Id. at 308-13.
181. See id. at 311-12.
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cutting-edge developments"8 or cutting R&D expenditures al-
together,1"' either of which foreshadows a corresponding de-
*184
crease in innovation.
Importantly, an aversion to risk is likely to disproportion-
ately affect the developing field of biologics and biosimilars. Not
only are the development costs higher, but much of the technol-
ogy is still theoretical and success is uncertain.'15 Without the
promise of exclusive commercial exploitation and the potential
windfall of a successful product, many companies will
expectedly shy away from biosimilars altogether in favor of less
risky investments.'86 A shift in resources will temper the cur-
rent momentum toward finding breakthrough biologic treat-
ments for otherwise untreatable diseases, decreasing the pub-
lic's overall access to effective healthcare.' In sum, the lack of
practical alternatives for recovering costs means the imposition
of a highly significant, highly predictable system denying pa-
tent exclusivity in the field of pharmaceuticals would make a
reduction in innovation almost inevitable.
B. THE SAFE HARBOR'S IMPACT ON INNOVATION
As just demonstrated, the balance between the benefits
and costs of a liability exception is strongly weighted in favor of
the benefits when the impact on the patentee's market is min-
imal. Not only does protecting the market curtail the patentee's
specific costs, but it diminishes the risk of a negative impact on
182. Id. at 312 ("A pharmaceutical company seeking to reduce risk by di-
versifying into less risky . .. research and development will likely seek out ac-
tivities in which it already possesses existing expertise. . . . In such a scenario,
pharmaceutical research and development is curtailed to achieve the reduced
risk via diversification.").
183. Id. ("[A] pharmaceutical company may attempt to achieve a healthy
balance sheet by reducing expenditures on research, development, and test-
ing.").
184. See id. at 312-13 ("The result of reducing risks by not developing
pharmaceuticals that might be [subject to lost exclusivity] is the same as re-
ducing risks through diversification-a decrease in the creation of break-
through pharmaceuticals. . . . Studies [also] indicate that the level of spending
on research, development, and testing directly corresponds with the creation of
new pharmaceuticals. . . . Accordingly, reducing research, development, and
testing expenditures would most likely result in the reduction, and possibly
the elimination, of the creation of breakthrough pharmaceuticals."); see also
SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note 33, at 3.
185. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 4-5.
186. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note
33, at 13.
187. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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innovation, maximizing overall social welfare and information
production. Pre-Momenta, the combination of two factors kept
the safe harbor's market impact in check: (1) the restriction of
the safe harbor to pre-approval activities; and (2) the historical
dominance of small molecule drugs. Post-Momenta, these fac-
tors no longer function to adequately curb market harm to the
patentee.
1. Pre-Momenta Safeguards
The first factor traditionally limiting the safe harbor's
market impact was the lack of jurisprudence extending safe
harbor protection after FDA approval.' Restricting the safe
harbor to pre-approval activities shields pharmaceutical patent
holders from market harm by excluding essentially all commer-
cially significant activities from protection.'89 Because a drug
cannot be sold until approved, pre-approval infringement does
not result in significant commercial competition for the patent
holder; 90 continued unauthorized use after approval to com-
mercialize a product would expose the unauthorized user to in-
fringement liability.'9 ' Competitors faced with such a pre-
approval restriction must therefore refrain from unauthorized
sales of an infringing product until the relevant patents expire
or risk an infringement suit.'92 Either way, the patent holder's
commercial exclusivity expectations are preserved during the
life of the patent.
Even absent an explicit restriction limiting the safe har-
bor's scope to pre-approval activities, the established domi-
nance of small molecule drugs has been a second factor limiting
market harm. Specifically, the relatively straightforward na-
188. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 1, at 45 ("This section
does not permit the commercial sale of a patented drug by the party using the
drug to develop such information. . . ."); id. pt. 2, at 30 (noting that the inter-
ference from the limited testing of a drug for approval purposes is "de
minimus"). But see id. pt. 1, at 45 ("[I]t does permit the commercial sale of re-
search quantities of active ingredients to such party.").
190. See Hearing, supra note 73, at 926 (memorandum of Alfred B.
Engelberg, Patent Counsel, Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association)
("[T]he limited testing activity required to obtain FDA approval of a generic
drug would not normally result in the use of even a single generic tablet for its
therapeutic purpose during the life of a valid patent.").
191. Committee Report, supra note 73, pt. 2, at 30 ("[The generic manufac-
turer is not permitted to market the patented drug during the life of the pa-
tent . . .. ").
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
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ture of small molecule drug development creates a de facto bar-
rier to post-approval commercial competition. 93 Because "small
molecule drugs ... can [generally] be synthesized relatively
easily and characterized readily with laboratory techniques,"'94
protection for small-molecules is focused on patents claiming
either the product itself or a method of using the product to
treat a particular condition.' Prior to approval, unauthorized
use of these patented compounds or methods has value related
to information production but cannot result in drug sales.196 Af-
ter approval, however, the value of the compound or treatment
method is generally associated with commercial sales. ' This
commercial consumption lacks a nexus to FDA requirements.!
Without that nexus, most post-approval unauthorized uses fall
outside the safe harbor's statutory language specifying the use
be related to submitting information required by law.
2. Post-Momenta Considerations
Unfortunately, evolution of the safe harbor and the phar-
maceutical industry has eroded the effectiveness of these im-
plicit safeguards, leaving the safe harbor in need of reform for
the twenty-first century. Still, neither strictly limiting the safe
193. See Woodage, supra note 93, 1 11 ("Because small-molecule drugs ...
have simple chemical structures, it is relatively easy to establish chemical
identity between a generic competitor and its corresponding reference prod-
uct.").
194. Therapeutic Research Center, Approval of Generic Enoxaparin
(Lovenox), PHARMACIST'S LETTER/PRESCRIBER's LETTER, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1,
available at http://pharmacytechniciansletter.therapeuticresearch.com/pl/
detaildocuments/260902.pdf?cs=&s=PTL.
195. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (requiring applicants to only list pa-
tents claiming the drug or its method of use, not patents on manufacturing
methods); Woodage, supra note 93, 5 ("[Clonsideration of manufacturing
methods will play an important role . . . in patent litigation between . .. biolog-
ic manufacturers in ways that they have not in the small-molecule drug con-
text.").
196. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Michael Vella et al., Behind the Footnote in Merck KGaA v.
Integra, PHARMACEUTICAL L. INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 1, 2, available at httpi/
www.mofo.com/filesfPublication/e729abl9-a8f6-42fd-a4b6-2ddal8b5ce8c/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3c993a04-fl 19-4a58-b276-dede5a9cd846/
051OMerck.pdf ("[Platented drug products['] . . . value primarily resides in
commercial sales to the general public after FDA approval . . . .").
198. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Nos. 09 Civ. 10112(KBF),
10 Civ. 7246(KBF), 2013 WL 3732867, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2013) (empha-
sizing that selling a patented invention to others is not a use protected under
the safe harbor and likening such commercialization to "a square peg in a
round hole").
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harbor to pre-approval activities (Classen) nor unrestrictedly
expanding it post-approval (Momenta) adequately balances in-
novation and access in a complex-molecule drug market. The
Momenta decision itself highlights the significant shortcomings
of such a bright-line distinction.
a. The Reduced Benefits of a Pre-Approval Limitation
Hatch-Waxman's expedited market entry for generic com-
petitors upon expiration of the brand patents does not always
work as intended when it comes to complex small molecule
drugs and biosimilars. For traditional small molecules, a chem-
ical compound that comes off patent generally can be copied
and its identity verified through basic, publicly available, ana-
lytical chemistry techniques. 99 But with more complex mole-
cules, small differences in manufacturing can significantly af-
fect the end product and cause its molecular composition to
vary.200 This potential for variation creates challenges for show-
ing bioequivalence of small molecule drugs or establishing that
a biosimilar is "highly similar" to its reference product.01 Satis-
fying these standards may often require developing novel ana-
lytical techniques to verify the identity of each commercial
batch of drug marketed after FDA approval.202 While developing
such techniques could create significant barriers to generic en-
try, those techniques may also be eligible for patent protection
199. See, e.g., SCHACHT & THOMAS, INNOVATION ISSUES, supra note 74, at
2-3 ("Typical pharmaceutical products consist of small molecules .. . that may
be readily characterized and reproduced through well-understood chemical
processes."); see also supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
200. Huub Schellekens, Biosimilar Therapeutics-What Do We Need to Con-
sider?, 2 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION PLUS i27, i28 (2009),
available at http://ckj.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/suppl_1/i27.full.pdf+html
("Small changes in, or differences between, manufacturing processes may have
a significant impact on the quality, purity, biological characteristics and clini-
cal activity of the final product.").
201. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d
1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013); Lisa S.
Rotenstein et al., Opportunities and Challenges for Biosimilars: What's on the
Horizon in the Global Insulin Market?, 30 CLINICAL DIABETES 138, 139 (2012),
available at http://clinical.diabetesjournals.org/content/30/4/138.full.pdf+html.
202. Ewa M. Davison & David K. Tellekson, Murky Waters: Post-Approval
Regulatory Activities and the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor, INTELL. PROP. BULL.
(Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain View, Cal.), Winter 2013, at 3, 5, available at
httpsJ/www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Intellectual-Property-Bulletin
-Winter-2013.pdf ("Such manufacturers may ... seek patent protection for the
analytical and quality control methods that they often must develop to satisfy
FDA regulations requiring a demonstration that the biosimilar 'is highly simi-
lar to the reference product.'"); see also Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1348.
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and reward those entities investing in their development with a
period of exclusivity.203
The fact that the Momenta dispute was between two gener-
ic manufacturers punctuates this new reality. Momenta sought
to exclude other generic competitors on the basis of a patent
wholly separate from any patents on the actual drug product,
which had already entered the public domain.204 Furthermore,
the litigated patent related to a method endorsed, although not
specifically required, by the FDA for producing the identity da-
ta necessary to maintain approval of any generic version of the
drug.205 The additional hurdle created by the extra identity re-
quirements gave Momenta an edge over other generic rivals
and slowed the proliferation of generic competition.206
But it is exactly this competition created by multiple gener-
ic entrants that produces meaningful reductions in price. 207 A
system imposing additional patent-based barriers to market
entry after the brand patents expire hinders subsequent en-
trants and encumbers realization of the social benefits associ-
ated with generic competition. 20s Thus a public-benefit rationale
exists for limiting the right to exclude associated with these
added patent barriers, similar to the justifications supporting
the safe harbor's original enactment.209 In fact, the significantly
higher prices associated with complex pharmaceuticals like bio-
logics mean the positive externalities associated with competi-
tion are particularly acute. 21 0 At the same time, categorically
limiting the safe harbor to pre-approval uses could allow patent
protection on required post-approval manufacturing and quali-
ty control methods to completely freeze competitors out of the
203. See Davison & Tellekson, supra note 202, at 5.
204. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1349-52.
205. See id. at 1351-53.
206. Id. at 1351.
207. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 n.4
("[R]esearch has shown that generic drug prices decrease relative to the num-
ber of generic manufacturers that enter the market.").
208. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the patent-
based barrier to entry ratified in Roche).
209. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 590 (highlighting Con-
gress's concern with escalating drug prices and its desire to remove barriers to
competition to control costs).
210. See BOURGOIN, supra note 34, at 1 (presenting both the high costs of
biologics and the estimated cost savings from biosimilars); see also supra notes
35-37, 40 and accompanying text.
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market."' A pre-approval liability exception alone is therefore
insufficient to achieve the safe harbor's intended public benefits
of reduced prices and increased access in a world of biologics
and complex small molecule drugs.
b. The Increased Costs of a Post-Approval Application
An unqualified extension of safe harbor protection to all
post-approval activities, however, also does not adequately bal-
ance innovation and access. This approach-the approach es-
sentially endorsed in Momenta-would produce individual and
social costs arguably outweighing the benefits associated with
increased biologic competition. Again, the explanation rests in
the importance of manufacturing method patents to complex
drugs.212 These patents implicate commercial activities that oc-
cur after FDA approval in a manner dissimilar to product pa-
tents. Unlike a patented product, whose value derives primari-
ly from post-approval commercial consumption that is
unequivocally excluded from safe harbor protection,213 a method
patent has independent commercial value when used to pro-
duce a sellable product. 214 This commercial production intrinsi-
cally implicates post-approval activities. Momenta demon-
strates that if the method generates FDA-required
information-which it arguably often will 2 15-extending
§ 271(e)(1) to cover post-approval uses could shield infringers
from liability for the entire useful lifespan of the patent.2 16
Permitting rivals to freely exploit the patented method al-
lows them to capitalize on the method's commercially beneficial
uses and produce a competing product without incurring any of
the costs associated with developing the method.1  This essen-
tially creates a free-rider situation and imposes significant in-
211. Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1359 (expressing concern for the situation
"where a drug has received approval, but is nevertheless kept from the market
based on an FDA mandated testing requirement").
212. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
214. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1351.
215. See id. at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that the interpretation
of "submission" to include record retention for inspection purposes "would al-
low almost all activity by pharmaceutical companies to constitute 'submission'
and therefore justify a free license to trespass" (emphasis added)).
216. Id. at 1366 ("[T]his court rewrites the law to allow Amphastar to in-
fringe Momenta's patent throughout the entire life of Momenta's patent and for
the purpose of obtaining profits on commercial sales of a product that competes
with the patentee.").
217. See id. at 1362.
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dividual market harm on the patentee.218 Because market harm
correlates with the ease of substitution, the greatest risk for
market harm with biologics stems from directly substitutable
interchangeable biologics and closely competing biosimilars21 9
the exact products the BPCIA was designed to foster.220 This
explains why the developing biosimilar market is particularly
affected by post-approval application of the safe harbor.
The potential for market harm is compounded by the safe
harbor's design, which forecloses several options a patent own-
er generally has when its exclusive rights are threatened. First,
the statute fails to secure a royalty or alternative remuneration
for the patentee to offset a decrease in market share.221 Second,
the safe harbor actually creates a disincentive to license the pa-
tented technology. Not only does § 271(e)(1) not require any
sort of dialogue between the parties,2 2 but the lack of remuner-
ation hinders potential licensing agreements.' While a patent
owner faced with the safe harbor may be more inclined to nego-
tiate, the competitor's incentive is reduced-the possibility of
free, unrestricted use of the patent is apt to outweigh the terms
of most potential licensing agreements. 24 Even the threat of lit-
igation loses its luster as a bargaining tool under the safe har-
bor, as the wide array of information mandated by the FDA and
the significant judicial expansion of the safe harbor's scope
have greatly increased the likely umbrella of protection for
would-be infringers.225
Absent remuneration or a license, the primary benefit re-
tained by a patent holder faced with competition from an in-
fringer excused under the safe harbor is whatever market posi-
tion it was able to secure prior to the competitors' entrance.2 2 6
218. See id.
219. See supra notes 146, 151-54 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
221. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Momenta, 686
F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
223. Cf. Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303 (explaining that the threat of re-
muneration for excused infringement "provide[s] a strong incentive for parties
to negotiate among themselves to reach an agreement").
224. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 1367; supra note 215.
226. See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Gener-
ic Drug Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2158 (2011) (associating early entry and exclusivity with
price discrimination that can lead to "substantial revenues and profits," as
1596 [98:1565
CHANGING COURSE
But while the BPCIA grants a pioneer biologic a substantial
twelve years of regulatory exclusivity,27 the first interchangea-
ble approved only receives a median period of exclusivity of
eighteen months. 28 There is no exclusivity granted for subse-
quent interchangeable products or biosimilars.229 These exclu-
sivity periods remain unchanged even if the follow-on manufac-
turer invests substantial time and resources developing
methods to satisfy the FDA's criteria for demonstrating "same-
ness."2"' After Momenta, the safe harbor permits later entrants
to use those same methods to produce interchangeable or easily
substitutable products without consideration for the timing of
the innovator's market entry or the opportunity for exclusive
market occupation.' Thus the safe harbor makes it likely two
manufacturers will be similarly situated in the market despite
only one of them having invested the resources to produce the
necessary technology. The result is little to no advantage-
patent or otherwise-bestowed on these forerunners of follow-
on biologic development.
Nowhere is the potential for extreme devaluation of these
types of process patents by an unrestrained safe harbor more
obvious than in the Momenta decision itself. As Judge Rader
noted in his dissent, the unchecked application of the safe har-
bor to post-approval uses of process patents removes the patent
owner's right to exclude during any part of the patent life and
"essentially render [s] manufacturing method patents worth-
less."232 He concluded by emphasizing the inequities of such a
well as the "'first mover' advantage, meaning that even when price is matched,
the first [entrant] may be likely to capture a higher share of the market").
227. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2006).
228. See id. § 262(k)(6) (providing a range of exclusivity from twelve to for-
ty-two months depending on the litigation status of the interchangeable appli-
cation at the time of the subsequent filing, with eighteen months of exclusivity
granted for applications unencumbered by litigation).
229. See id.; Ronald A. Rader, An Analysis of the US Biosimilars Develop-
ment Pipeline and Likely Market Evolution, BIOPROCESS INT'L, June 2013, at
16, 20, available at http//www.bioprocessintl.com/multimedia/archive/00219/
BPI_A_131106SUPAR02_219312a.pdf ("[B]iosimilars get no reward for being
first to market. In fact, the first companies to file will probably bear the brunt
of resolving patent disputes, which could cost tens of millions of dollars, allow-
ing products filed/approved later to avoid much of that trouble. The first to file
also will probably have to face more regulatory hurdles.").
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6); Rader, supra note 229, at 20.
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
232. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
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system that "abrogates [an entity's] hard-achieved property
right and reallocates that entitlement to its competitors.
Momenta also foreshadows the corresponding decrease in
innovation likely to accompany this extreme devaluation of
manufacturing method patents. Because Amphastar manufac-
tured an exact substitute for Momenta's enoxaparin product,
the court excused otherwise infringing activities with the high-
est market significance for the patentee.2 " The court's liberal
interpretation of § 271(e)(1)'s liability exception also makes its
applicability to similar analytical methods for demonstrating
"sameness" not only predictable, but almost a foregone conclu-
sion."' Together those factors create the perfect storm to deter
would-be innovators considering investing the significant time
and resources needed to bring a biosimilar or generic complex
small molecule drug to market.23 ' They also discourage later
entrants from innovating better methods for meeting the FDA's
similarity requirements.3 Ultimately, Momenta makes clear
that unchecked application of the safe harbor to post-approval
activities fails to adequately uphold the safe harbor's objective
of preserving innovation.
III. A NEW SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK POST-
MOMENTA
The time has come to take the safe harbor in a new direc-
tion. This Part reasons that § 271(e)(1)'s impact on market sig-
nificance must be readjusted to preserve an equilibrium be-
tween the costs and benefits of the safe harbor in today's
changing pharmaceutical landscape. While some desirable im-
233. Id. at 1376 (further characterizing the development as "a sad day for
property owners and an undeserved victory for those who decline to invest in
the expense and difficulty of discovery and invention").
234. See id. at 1351 (majority opinion) ("The approval of Amphastar's ver-
sion of enoxaparin, and the resultant ruinous competition of another generic
version of the drug, threatened [Momenta's] unique market position."); supra
notes 144-46, 151-52 and accompanying text.
235. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting); supra note 167
and accompanying text.
236. See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (comparing the
court's outcome to "a teacher who rewards the top student by allowing her
peers to copy her exam answers" to explain how the decision "does violence to
patent law and future research incentives in this field").
237. See, e.g., id. at 1369 ("Amphastar is free to invent its own method to
satisfy these requirements. Instead it chooses to trespass."); id. at 1370 ("[If]
this court would permit copiers to infringe[, w]hat incentive remains to invest
in inventing a better test?").
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provements to the safe harbor are specific to biologics, other
ways to enhance the overall equity of the doctrine apply indis-
criminately to all pharmaceuticals. Regardless, change is re-
quired to increase the chance that the BPCIA's abbreviated ap-
proval pathway will produce a meaningful follow-on biologic
market that balances innovation and access.
The complexities of the problem suggest a three-step ap-
proach. First, the BPCIA's patent litigation procedures should
include enhanced notification provisions that better reflect the
types of patent protection associated with biologic development.
Second, the FDA should delay market entry for all entities rely-
ing on safe harbor protection as a shield from infringement lia-
bility for activities related to the commercial manufacture, use,
or sale of a product that has obtained federal regulatory ap-
proval. This step specifically includes extending the BPCIA's
exclusivity provisions for interchangeable products to all follow-
on biologics. Finally, patent owners should receive a reasonable
royalty for all safe harbor uses of their respective patents. By
reducing the market harm to patentees, the combination of
these compensation mechanisms should minimize potential
barriers to innovation.
A. LITIGATION FRAMEWORK
A key component of the abbreviated approval pathways
under both Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA is that they provide
mechanisms for identifying and resolving patent disputes. 38
These dispute resolution procedures work to facilitate equitable
competition by resolving patent challenges posed by subsequent
competitors before the competing product is approved.239 This
prevents market entry from being delayed by unproductive liti-
gation while identifying valid patent barriers to competition.240
It is during this dispute resolution process that a biologic man-
ufacturer accused of infringement might invoke safe harbor
protection in defense of its activities.
The existing BPCIA provisions, however, are inadequate to
fully embrace effective patent dispute resolution because they
only address conflicts between the sponsors of reference prod-
238. See supra notes 66, 92 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 57, at 595.
240. See, e.g., Ashlee B. Mehl, Note, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market
Exclusivity for Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?,
81 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 649, 650 (2006).
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uct applications and follow-on manufacturers. 2 41 But as ex-
plained above, potential patent disputes in the biologic realm
are not confined between reference product sponsors and manu-
facturers of follow-on products.24 2 Disputes can just as easily
arise between two follow-on manufacturers.2 43 Although noth-
ing prevents approved follow-on applicants from relying on tra-
24ditional channels to uncover potential infringement, 2 the ab-
sence of any notice mechanism increases the chance that
potentially infringing activities will not be discovered until well
after the competing product is commercialized. Thus, in order
to fully embrace the equities of the proposed solution, the bio-
logic dispute resolution procedures should also facilitate the
identification and resolution of patent conflicts between these
stakeholders. Such provisions would decrease the chance of un-
known infringement of patented manufacturing methods, bol-
stering confidence in the value of the invention.
Helpfully, the BPCIA already incorporates a framework for
notifying the reference product sponsor of all patents-
including manufacturing and quality control method patents-
potentially infringed by a follow-on applicant. 245 The BPCIA
should be amended to further require that subsequent follow-
on applicants give similar notice to all previously approved
manufacturers of the particular product for which they are
seeking approval. Although a complete assessment of the intri-
cacies of the BPCIA is beyond the scope of this Note, an effec-
tive amendment could theoretically be as simple as adding the
language "or previously approved subsection (k) applicant(s)"
wherever the term "reference product sponsor" appears in 42
U.S.C. § 262(1).246
Of course, increased disclosure raises concerns about confi-
dentiality for manufacturing systems and other proprietary in-
formation. As an initial safeguard, the BPCIA protects the dis-
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2006).
242. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
243. Cf Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (deciding a suit between generic manufacturers of a
complex small molecule drug), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
244. Cf id. at 1349-52 (resulting in patent infringement litigation despite
the absence of notification procedures covering the patent-in-suit).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 262(1) refers to an applicant for a follow-on product as a
"subsection (k) applicant" in reference to § 262(k), the subsection governing
the "licensure of biological products as biosimilar or interchangeable." See id.
§ 262(k); id. § 262(1).
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semination of confidential data by limiting the permitted recip-
ients of such information."' The proposed amendment includes
a further safeguard by only requiring notice be given to previ-
ously approved follow-on applicants. This limitation recognizes
the increased risk for improper appropriation of information by
entities competing for approval as those entities are actively
engaged in modifying their applications. Further, because the
FDA could ultimately deny both applications, the potential con-
troversy between two unapproved applicants is not ripe. If one
manufacturer's follow-on application is ultimately granted, that
manufacturer could activate the disclosure requirements by fol-
lowing procedures similar to those laid out in the BPCIA for
newly acquired patents.
Notably, the proposed amendment does not address the po-
tential for conflict between two biologic reference product appli-
cants. It also does not provide for notification of potential in-
fringement pertaining to "method of making" patents under
Hatch-Waxman. But in response to this first potential concern,
a biologic approved as a reference product and not as a follow-
on product cannot be directly substituted for another product
without prescriber intervention, lessening the threat of direct
market competition between two reference products. 249 As for
the second concern, history demonstrates that the importance
of manufacturing method patents is the exception and not the
norm in the context of Hatch-Waxman's ANDA provisions.2'
And as Momenta demonstrates, traditional methods for discov-
ering infringement still exist for those infrequent instances in-
volving the few complex small molecule drugs where manufac-
turing method patents might play a role.25'
247. Id. § 262(l)(1).
248. See id. § 262(l)(7) (requiring notice of all potentially infringed patents
within thirty days of the newly acquired right).
249. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (explaining how man-
ufacturing method patents have not been important for small molecule drugs
under Hatch-Waxman).
251. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
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B. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY2
A second way to restore equity to the safe harbor is to
counteract a liability exception granted for activities related to
the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of an FDA-regulated
product with a period of market exclusivity for the patent hold-
er. Thus, when the safe harbor protects these commercial activ-
ities, the FDA should be required to stay approval of the other-
wise-infringing entity's application. If the competing
application is already approved, the FDA should suspend it.
Similar to the BPCIA's current provisions granting exclusivity
to the first interchangeable biologic, the period of exclusivity
should depend on the approval and litigation status of the pa-
tent holder's application." In this vein, a system mimicking
these highly scrutinized exclusivity periods in the BPCIA might
be sufficient-providing exclusivity for twelve months after the
first commercial marketing of the patentee's product, eighteen
months if the product has yet to be commercialized but is unen-
cumbered by litigation, or forty-two months if litigation is ongo-
ing.254
Set exclusivity periods may not be workable in all conflict
permutations, however. Because of the potential for cross-
litigation in a field with multiple follow-on entrants, a defined
period of exclusivity obtained in litigation with one competitor
may expire while locked in litigation with another. Accordingly,
a period based on independent expert review that accompanies
a safe harbor determination may be more desirable. Nonethe-
less, even with defined exclusivity periods the proposed solu-
tion provides benefits over the status quo by preventing a free-
rider from usurping market share from the patentee. Although
exclusivity periods already exist for brand-name small molecule
drugs,2  biologic reference products,5  the first generic ANDA
filer,'5 and the first interchangeable biologic,2 8 this proposal
252. Although referred to as market exclusivity for convenience, the pro-
posal embodied in this section envisions scenarios where the recipient of the
"exclusivity" term is not in fact the exclusive market player (or even the exclu-
sive generic or biosimilar manufacturer). Nonetheless, delayed approval of
competitors creates some form of exclusivity for the recipient as compared to
those later market entrants.
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
254. Id.
255. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2006).
257. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
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would further promote innovation and market entrance by sub-
sequent interchangeable biologics, biosimilars, and complex
small drug manufacturers.25 9 Moreover, entities wanting to cir-
cumvent an imposed period of exclusivity may be incentivized
to innovate alternatives to patented methods for satisfying
FDA requirements.260
This prong of the solution eases the burden of the safe har-
bor on the primary benefit conferred upon a patent holder-the
right to exclude. As noted above, elimination of this right under
the safe harbor can either be temporary or persist for the entire
life of the patent.261 Delaying market entry of competitors bene-
fiting from a liability exception granted under the safe harbor
reintroduces the concept of exclusivity.
Market exclusivity is a common incentive in the world of
pharmaceuticals and FDA regulation, and its frequent use
highlights its commercially significant benefits.2 6 2 For tradi-
tional small molecule pharmaceuticals, early market entrance
is a strong predictor of success and profits.6 Market exclusivi-
ty is expected to have an even stronger correlation with success
or failure in the field of follow-on biologics, and the availability
(or lack thereof) of market exclusivity may determine whether
or not the abbreviated pathway for follow-on biologics takes
hold.264 Since direct competition from less expensive substitutes
lowers drug costs, success of the abbreviated pathway for bio-
logics is key to reducing health care costs in this expanding
field.26
Importantly, the proposed solution does not limit this rem-
edy to follow-on biologics, much less interchangeable biologics
or even BPCIA-regulated products. Momenta demonstrates
that the safe harbor indiscriminately imposes its inequities and
259. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (explaining how these
entities are most likely to be affected by commercially significant applications
of post-approval safe harbor protection).
260. Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
262. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Pro-
mote Pharmaceutical Innovation, 19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855 (2010).
263. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics,
87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 39 (2005) ("If a [generic pharmaceutical] firm ob-
tains early approval, it is likely to earn a positive return on its application-
related costs, whereas firms obtaining approval later in the process are likely
not to recover their sunk costs.").
264. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, supra note
33.
265. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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can have significant commercial implications for certain small
molecule drugs.6 In response, indiscriminate market exclusivi-
ty for all commercial applications of the safe harbor is desira-
ble. As the class of pharmaceuticals most likely to be impacted
by commercial applications of the safe harbor, however, follow-
on biologics can be expected to benefit most from this remedy.
C. REASONABLE ROYALTY
Finally, the imposition of a reasonable royalty for all safe
harbor uses would reduce the inequities caused by § 271(e)(1)'s
invariable creation of "free-riders" that receive the benefits of
innovation without incurring any of the costs. To be effective, a
royalty must be high enough to ensure the patentee realizes
some profits but low enough to allow for price competition by
the excused infringer.2 6 7 Imposing a royalty in this "sweet spot"
should preserve incentives to innovate while still creating
meaningful reductions in drug price.6 Importantly, the
existence of the royalty alone may actually reduce safe harbor
lawsuits by encouraging parties to negotiate a license and forgo
litigation.6 And in situations where negotiations are unsuc-
cessful or impractical, courts can readily impose the royalty
alongside a judicial determination that the safe harbor ap-
1*270plies.
With the importance of setting an effective royalty rate in
mind, opponents of reasonable royalties often lament the diffi-
culty of determining their value.27 ' Specifically, it can be prob-
lematic to determine the infringed patent's value to both the
patent owner and the infringer.27 2 This is particularly challeng-
ing in a context of a liability exception permitting ongoing be-
havior because the royalty applies not only to past infringe-
ment but also to any future infringement that occurs while the
266. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854
(2013).
267. See Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 1298, 1303.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 1298.
272. Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH &
RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2014).
1604 [ 98:1565
CHANGING COURSE
exception endures.2 " Because the protection granted by the safe
harbor has the potential to last the entire duration of the pa-
tent, adequately predicting the future value of the patent is
especially important for preserving the incentive to innovate.
This difficulty alone, however, is no justification for em-
bracing an inequitable and detrimental status quo that
provides no compensation. Moreover, valuation of reasonable
royalties is a common occurrence.274 For example, judicial de-
terminations of non-injunctive relief in antitrust and patent in-
fringement suits provide precedent for setting royalty rates.275
In this context, experts can often assist in valuing the patent.2 76
Indeed, federal regulation makes the pharmaceutical in-
dustry well-suited to expert valuation of royalties.27 7 Because
the date of entry of the generic can be determined in advance,
"the size of the potential revenue in each market can be pro-
jected with some accuracy. "278 A reasonable royalty based on
market potential can then be calculated by extrapolating that
data based on the number of entrants at any given time. 279
273. See Neal E. Solomon, What Is a Reasonable Royalty? A Comparative
Assessment of Patent Damages Methodologies 3 (June 11, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
1623982 (arguing that reasonable royalties tend to "undervalue patents by an
ex post facto view of future and unknowable markets").
274. Richard F. Cauley, Defunding the Trolls: Attacking the Damages
Claim, IP LAW 360 (Portfolio Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 14, 2008, at 1,
available at http://www.whglawfirm.com/CM/Articles/Defunding%20the%
20Trolls.pdf ("The most common award for patent infringement ... is a 'rea-
sonable royalty .... ).
275. Yosick, supra note 167, at 1303; see, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86
F.3d 1098, 1109-10 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the calculation of reasonable
royalties); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Ply-
wood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen factors
courts may consider in determining a reasonable royalty), modified, 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). See generally Methodolo-
gies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, supra note 272 (providing
an overview of several methodologies for assessing reasonable royalties).
276. See generally Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your Royal-
ty?, J. AccT., Sept. 2008, at 56 (detailing considerations for experts assisting in
calculating royalties).
277. See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 263, at 37 ("[B]ecause a market begins
when the patent on an existing drug expires, the date at which the market
opens to competitors is known in advance and the potential revenue can be
projected with some accuracy. . .
278. Id.
279. See id.
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The possibility that some stakeholders will no longer be
able to afford to innovate if required to pay for the technology is
another primary justification for excluding royalties from the
safe harbor. 2 0 The concern is that research and development
often implicates several patents held by multiple companies
and that a need to pay each company to use the relevant pa-
tents may outweigh the value of any potential end-product of
the research.281 This argument is amplified in contexts where
the research is targeted at developing an intermediary product
or research tool that has little or no commercial value in and of
itself. 282 In those situations, an inventor faced with one or more
restrictions on the right to exclude may simply choose to aban-
don the research altogether."'
This argument, however, is of decreased relevance among
pharmaceutical manufacturers as the end research goal is gen-
erally a commercial product with the potential for significant
market returns.28 4 Moreover, a case-by-case royalty amount, ra-
ther than a fixed rate, mitigates these concerns and allows for
adjustment of the remedy in each specific situation to better
promote the safe harbor's goals. For one thing, individual royal-
ty awards mean less commercially valuable or less frequently
used technology can be priced accordingly.285 And while safe
harbor protection does not turn on a lack of non-infringing al-
ternatives, a case-by-case approach permits consideration of
available alternatives when setting the rate. Imposing a lower
royalty rate when faced with significant technological hurdles
and a single means for meeting the FDA's standards could less-
en an otherwise high barrier to market entry.2 86 On the other
280. Cf Freeburg, supra note 42, at 410 ("A common objection to compulso-
ry licensing is that it reduces the incentive to invent. . . .").
281. Cf id. at 412 ("Reach-through royalties, where licenses can continue
to collect fees on downstream inventions . . . . could create a problem of royalty
stacking. . . .").
282. Id. ("[R]oyalty stacking . . . is probably not a good suggestion unless
the end product actually contains the research tool.").
283. Id. (describing how royalty stacking can negatively affect downstream
inventions).
284. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
285. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining that patents on re-
search tools have not been proven to impede development because their lim-
ited commercial value corresponds with minimal compensation for patent
owner), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013).
286. See id. at 1360 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that an FDA
requirement for a single testing method will produce a complete barrier to
market competition). But see id. at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting) (supporting the
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hand, a higher royalty rate could shift activities to non-
infringing alternatives if they exist. At the very least, a higher
rate rewards subsequent innovators in situations of competing
alternatives, which may encourage even more innovation. 287 UP.
timately, it is this type of flexible system that will best balance
the costs of innovation against the costs of increasing access to
affordable medication.
CONCLUSION
While the safe harbor once operated to balance innovation
and the public interest, market changes and an increasingly
broad judicial interpretation of § 271(e)(1) have given rise to
the need to revisit its application. In effect, the Federal Cir-
cuit's endorsement of the safe harbor's application to post-FDA-
approval activities in Momenta has the potential to devalue an
entire class of key manufacturing method patents related to the
quickly developing field of biopharmaceuticals by authorizing
unchecked infringement of the patents for commercial purpos-
es. In addition to impacting individual drug markets, the ex-
panded scope of safe harbor protection for significant commer-
cial activity is likely to stifle innovation in an increasingly
important field of the pharmaceutical industry, negatively im-
pacting the overall public health and welfare.
The underlying justifications and positive practical effects
of the safe harbor can be retained, however, if the statute is
adapted to compensate entities whose patent rights are im-
pacted. In addition to enhanced notification provisions for re-
vealing potential infringement among follow-on manufacturers,
that compensation scheme should include both a reasonable
royalty for all safe harbor applications and a period of exclusiv-
ity for patentees faced with excused post-approval commercial
infringement of their invention. By allowing patent owners to
recoup some of their costs and develop their respective mar-
kets, the potentially lucrative return on investment driving
current levels of pharmaceutical innovation will be preserved
for years to come.
argument that a higher rate could incentivize the development of alternative
techniques for meeting requirements).
287. See id. at 1370 (discussing the importance of retaining means for in-
centivizing improvements).
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an informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief the ac-
tions they took were in the best interests of the corporation."
The business judgment rules serves as formidable protection
for corporate directors and officers. In order for stockholder-
plaintiffs to rebut the presumption of enforceability in the con-
text of forum selection clauses, they may introduce evidence of
directors' breaches of the duty of care of the duty of loyalty.18
If stockholder-plaintiffs are successful and rebut the pre-
sumption of enforceability, courts should proceed to the third
step and review the transaction under an entire fairness stand-
ard.18 ' This necessarily involves a case-by-case inquiry." In or-
der to flesh out the second and third steps, which are necessari-
ly intertwined, the solution walks through circumstances that
may feasibly arise or have arisen in the duty of care and duty of
loyalty contexts. Unlike in Boilermakers, this exercise does not
aim to outline a "parade of horribles" or engage with hypothet-
ical, law school-esque scenarios.8 7 Instead, the purpose of ap-
183. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1988) ("As a rule of evidence, [the business judgment rule] creates 'a presump-
tion that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.' The presump-
tion initially attaches to a director-approved transaction within a board's con-
ferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence of 'fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment." (se-
cond alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
184. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that
the plaintiff has a burden of proof to rebut this presumption by introducing
evidence of self-dealing or lack of due care), overruled on other grounds by
Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695 (2009); see supra Part I(A).
185. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362-63 (Del. 1993),
modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
186. See, e.g., Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The ex-
istence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach thereof, are both questions of fact.").
This approach disavows a bright line rule that advocates for or against the en-
forceability of forum selection clauses. Cf Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5,
at 402 (rejecting a bright-line rule, but articulating a different fiduciary duties
analysis).
187. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2013). Compare Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 364
("Courts applying Delaware law to adjudicate the validity of an ICFS provision
as adopted therefore need not speculate as to every conceivable circumstance
that might later arise in connection with a future effort to enforce that provi-
sion under conditions that are unknown and unknowable as of the date of the
provision's adoption."), with Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del. 1992)
("There was no basis to invoke some hypothetical risk of harm rather than an
examination of the board's proven, and entirely proper, conduct."). It is appro-
priate to consider various fact scenarios for the purpose of generating a pre-
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plying this framework in possible situations is that they will
likely arise in "as-applied" circumstances in future fiduciary
duties derivative litigation. Therefore, the duty of care will first
be analyzed, followed by the duty of loyalty.
1. The Duty of Care
Plaintiffs may show a violation of the duty of care suffi-
cient to pass step two by demonstrating that directors did not
engage in a process of informed decision-making.""' This analy-
sis requires consideration of more than whether "Delaware
courts will fail to hold directors properly responsible for their
actions." 89 Directors must reach their decision to adopt a bylaw
with a forum selection clause through "informed, reasonable de-
liberation."9 o Fortunately for directors, the travails of multi-
jurisdictional litigation and the phenomenon of the lead plain-
tiff race are well-documented and easily serve as a basis for
rational decision.191 In addition, the fiduciaries' conduct is only
actionable if the directors are grossly negligent." Plaintiffs' as-
sertions that directors fail to consider the effect of forum selec-
tion clauses on stockholders likely misses this mark sufficient
to rebut the presumption of enforceability A la business judg-
ment rule."' If directors truly were irrational, for example,
identifying Delaware as an exclusive forum for a Minnesota
corporation, they may come closer to rebutting the presumption
of enforceability. Instead, stockholders may be more successful
scriptive decisionmaking framework. In an actual case, the court is bound by
the facts, not by hypothetical inquiries. These two situations are distinct, and
prescriptive/normative analysis can inform and construct the decisionmaking
process.
188. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. This paragraph assumes that the cor-
poration does not have an exculpation provision described in Delaware law.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013).
189. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 402.
190. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
191. See supra Part I(B). Contra Revised Verified Supplement to the Com-
plaint at 14, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73
A.3d 934 (2013) (No. 7220-CS) ("[Tihe only duplicative litigation Chevron and
its Board have experienced resulted from the Exclusive Forum Bylaw whose
purported purpose was to avoid duplicative litigation." (emphasis in original)).
192. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 750
(Del. Ch. 2005) (adding that duty of care violations are rarely found).
193. See Verified Complaint at 95, Neighbors v. Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc., No. 7240-CS, 2012 WL 467520 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012) (arguing inter
alia, that adoption of a form bylaw evinces directors' lack of consideration of
the specific terms and effects of the bylaw at issue).
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in identifying a breach of the duty of loyalty in order to proceed
to the third step that triggers the "entire fairness" standard.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
A successful rebuttal of the presumption of enforceability
sufficient to proceed to the third step may depend on the timing
of the duty of loyalty claim. The timing of duty of loyalty chal-
lenges fit into three groups: pre-planning before a suit is filed,
after alleged wrongdoing, and in the midst of ongoing litigation.
Similarly to the duty of care context, stockholder-plaintiffs face
a distinct uphill battle in rebutting the presumption of enforce-
ability sufficient to have a court determine the "entire fairness"
of the transaction.
The first scenario is an extension of anti-takeover and poi-
son pill jurisprudence, in which courts allow corporations to
keep anti-takeover methods on the shelf for potential, future
use.194 As in that context, it is unlikely that courts would find
self-dealing if directors adopted a clause as a form of pre-
planning for possible, future derivative litigation.' 95
In the second scenario, a board's adoption of a clause after
alleged wrongdoing provides a clearer self-dealing scenario;
Galaviz v. Berg can be reconciled in this way.'96 In the Galaviz
scenario, the board can proffer few alternative reasons for their
actions other than their self-interest in escaping liability.'9 In
so doing, they effectively place their self-interest over the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Although con-
fining litigation to Delaware does not assure directors' success,
194. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trig-
ger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.
J. 1087, 1088-89 (2012) ("Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively
'poison pills,' enable a target board to 'poison' a takeover attempt by making it
prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage
of the target company's stock .. .. [Delaware courts generally] have approved
traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices for well-intentioned
boards of directors.").
195. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 366 (analogizing forum se-
lection clauses to poison pills as a pre-planning tool for hostile takeovers).
196. See, e.g., Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 11772 (N.D. Cal.
2011). The holding of the Galaviz case can be reconciled with this prescriptive
framework because, as a matter of corporate law, it implicates a fact scenario
that involves self-dealing. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 407
(arguing that the Galaviz court ignored controlling precedent when it relied on
a vested rights theory to find the forum selection clause unenforceable). A self-
dealing supersedes considerations of whether the plaintiffs' claims have vest-
ed.
197. See, e.g., Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
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it certainly increases their odds.' 98 Delaware courts confer bene-
fits on directors, strategic advantages that stockholders do not
necessarily share.
Finally, directors could also adopt a clause in the midst of
pending litigation in a foreign court. Again, stockholders could
implicate directors' self-dealing incentives in adopting the
clause. 20 0 This scenario provides a direct affront to contract law,
although this may be difficult to establish after Boilermakers
upheld the contractual validity of forum selection in the corpo-
rate context.2 01 While the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in contract law is well-settled, contract law likely does
not allow one party to unilaterally add a forum selection clause
after litigation has begun.202 Parties must instead resort to hav
ing cases dismissed, transferred, or stayed. 20 Though most cas-
es will likely be stalled at the second step, rebutting the pre-
sumption of enforceability of forum selection clauses, the
possibility of reaching the "entire fairness" standard provides a
roadmap for courts to follow in these cases. Indeed, it provides
the best alternative to existing counterarguments.
C. ALTERNATIVES ARE INEFFECTIVE
Yet alternatives exist. Some advocate an outright ban on
forum selection bylaws in the corporate context, or a slightly
more mediated solution as long as directors engage in good
204governance. Opponents cannot turn a blind eye to the very
real inconvenience and waste of resources that is caused by un-
constrained multi-jurisdictional litigation.205 In most contexts,
198. See supra Part I(B).
199. See supra Part I(B).
200. This argument is distinct from whether stockholders have perfected
their right to sue in a foreign forum. But c.f Grundfest & Savelle, supra note
5, at 377 (discussing how stockholders have typically failed to perfect their
right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction).
201. See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. at 1174 ("To whatever degree bylaws may
generally be contractual in nature, however, Oracle here seeks to rely on prin-
ciples of corporate law with respect to how its bylaws could be amended. Ora-
cle has not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a venue provi-
sion that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to existing
contract terms." (emphasis in original)). Contra Boilermakers Local 154 Re-
tirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013).
202. See supra Part I(A)(4).
203. See id. Whether a court dismisses, transfers, or stays a case depends
on the court and/or the state.
204. See supra Part II(A)(1).
205. See supra Part I(B).
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forum selection clauses provide a useful solution to the travails
of multi-jurisdictional litigation. A rebuttable presumption of
enforceability provides plaintiffs with an avenue in which to
bring legitimate fiduciary duties claims, while weeding out
strike suits.
Unconditional enforcement of forum selection bylaws faces
similar problems, but strikes a different, improper balance.
Stockholders with possible fiduciary duties' arguments could be
locked out of their preferred venues, in a full concession to mul-
ti-jurisdictional problems. Grundfest's "fiduciary out" solution,
that allows directors to waive the forum selection bylaw, fits
with this Note's proposed solution. Together, they establish a
compromise: directors monitor their fiduciary duties and stock-
holders may rebut the presumption of directors' authority. If
directors concede to a venue or stockholders are successful, liti-
gation proceeds; if not, the case continues in Delaware, which is
not a bad alternative.
Finally, doing nothing is not an option. This hotly-debated
and increasingly-litigated topic demands a solution. This Note
provides a fiduciary duties-specific solution for courts outside of
Delaware to when they inevitably encounter these cases.
CONCLUSION
In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers began the discus-
sion about the enforceability of forum selection bylaws, but sig-
nificant questions remain. It is unclear how non-Delaware
courts will interpret this progression of cases, especially when
plaintiffs raise breach of fiduciary duties claims about directors'
uses of the forum selection bylaws. This Note proposes and de-
velops a structure for the resolution of these disputes. Forum
selection bylaws should be presumptively enforceable because
of directors' authority to adopt bylaws. Plaintiffs may challenge
this rebuttable presumption by showing that directors breached
their duties of care and/or loyalty. If they are successful, direc-
tors must demonstrate the "entire fairness" of the forum selec-
tion bylaw to stockholders. At all times, directors could waive
the forum selection bylaws if their fiduciary duties so require.
In this way, courts mediate a compromise between corporate
defendants' and stockholder-plaintiffs' competing interests and
in effect, organize this section of intracorporate litigation with-
in existing DGCL precedent. For non-Delaware courts, today
may not be the day, but when it is, this Note will help them get
on their way.
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